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an appellate court would normally accept a lower court's finding of a
prima facie Batson violation and only consider the proffered explanations,
the Joe court stated that in the present case the record was insufficient to
conduct a meaningful review. The Joe court then remanded the case so
that the district court could conduct a full Batson analysis, make factual
findings, and state rationales for its rulings.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v. Joe is in accord with
other circuits. Other circuits have agreed that no one fact or relevant
circumstance should be controlling in evaluating a Batson challenge.17
Furthermore, common sense dictates that the best time to evaluate a
Batson challenge is before the trial begins. The remedy for a Batson
violation is inexpensive and easy to provide prior to trial, but becomes
increasingly difficult and expensive as the litigation proceeds. Batson raises
several difficult questions, mainly as to what constitutes a valid reason
for the exercise of a peremptory challenge. The Fourth Circuit's decision
in Joe dealt with a less difficult, more mechanical procedural question,
but a necessary one in helping lower courts deal with Batson challenges.
LABOR LAW

Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1991) (ADEA or the Act) both to promote the employment of older persons based on their ability, rather than on their age,
and to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination. Section 626 of the Act
provides remedies for violations of the ADEA. While front pay is not a
clearly enumerated remedy, courts have sustained its award under the
Act. 38 Against this background, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit considered, in Duke v. Uniroyal Inc., 928 F.2d 1413

(4th Cir. 1991), whether an award of front pay is an aspect of equitable
relief to be considered by the court or a legal question that should be
submitted to the jury.
Uniroyal Chemical Company (the Company or Uniroyal), as part of
a reduction in its work force, discharged employees Jesse T. Duke (Duke)

37. See United States v. Young-Bey, 893 F.2d 178, 180 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that fact
that simply because blacks are ultimately seated on jury does not necessarily bar finding of
discrimination in use of peremptory challenges); United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695,
698 n.4 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that fact that all Hispanic jurors were challenged was
significant though not required for showing prima facie Batson violation); United States v.
Horsley, 864 F.2d 1543, 1546 (1lth Cir. 1989) (holding that prima facie Batson case does not
require pattern of peremptory strikes against minimum of three or four black venirepersons
because number of black jurors struck is not dispositive of issue); United States v. SanginetoMiranda, 859 F.2d 1501, 1521 (6th Cir. 1988) (refusing to adopt per se rule that prima facie
case is established if prosecution used its peremptory challenges to exclude blacks because such
a rule would not allow court to consider all relevant factors).
38. See McNeil v. Economic Laboratory Inc., 800 F.2d 111, 118 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating
front pay, under ADEA, is within trial court's discretion); Pudge v. Fruehauf Corp., 690 F.
Supp. 692, 692 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (noting front pay should be awarded where needed to effectuate
purpose of ADEA).
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and Sidney W. Fox (Fox). Duke, age 51, was a sales representative of
Agri Chemicals and Fox, age 50, was a sales development representative.
Both plaintiffs were among the oldest in their departments. The Company
contended that it terminated Duke because the Company had eliminated
Duke's territory and assigned his customers to other territories and because
Duke's performance did not hold up well against the stated reduction
criteria. Similarly, Uniroyal claimed that the Company terminated Fox
because of his weak knowledge of herbicides and pesticides, an area which
Uniroyal had decided to promote. The plaintiffs alleged instead that
Uniroyal's articulated reasons for their terminations were a 'pretext for
age discrimination.
The Federal District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina
decided in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that the company had violated
the ADEA. The jury awarded Duke and Fox monetary compensation for
both front pay and back pay. Because the judge concluded that the
Company did not willfully violate the ADEA, the court did not award
liquidated damages. The judge also denied Fox's motion for reinstatement
and entered an award of attorney's fees and costs in the amount of
$298,130.81.
The Company appealed, arguing error in virtually every aspect of the
trial. Specifically, Uniroyal asserted that (1) the jury verdict was not
supported by substantial evidence of age discrimination; (2) various rulings
by the district court on the evidence were improper; (3) the district court
abused its discretion in refusing to sever plaintiffs' claims for trial; (4)
the instructions to the jury failed to accommodate adequately the particular
facts in evidence; (5) front pay should not have been submitted to the
jury; and (6) the district court abused its discretion in its award of
attorney's fees.
To resolve the first issue on appeal the Fourth Circuit noted that
under Herold v. Hajoca Corp., 864 F.2d 317, 319 (4th Cir. 1988), a
plaintiff must prove several elements to establish a prima facie case of
age discrimination in a reduction in work force case. First, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that he/she is in the protected age group. Second, the
plaintiff must show that the employer discharged him/her. Third, the
plaintiff must afford that, at the time of the discharge, plaintiff was
performing his/her job at a level that met his/her employer's legitimate
expectations. Finally, the plaintiff must allege that the employer retained
persons outside the protected age class in the same position or that there
was some other evidence that indicated that the employer did not treat
age neutrally when the employer dismissed the plaintiff.
The Fourth Circuit began by noting that Duke differed from Hajoca
in that Uniroyal had legitimate business reasons for reducing employees
in an identified group or territory and that Uniroyal's stated criterion for
selection was employee performance. Tailoring the Hajoca requirements
to the facts of Duke, the Fourth Circuit held that to establish a prima
facie case of age discrimination, the plaintiffs must establish that they
were protected by the ADEA, that they were performing at a level
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substantially equivalent to the lowest level of those retained in the group
or territory, and that the selection process resulted in the Company
retaining unprotected persons whose performance was at a level lower
than the plaintiffs'. The Fourth Circuit stated that once the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case, the employer may articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory basis of termination selection. If the employer asserts
a legitimate reason for the termination, the burden then shifts back to the
plaintiff to demonstrate that the employer's legitimate reason for the
termination was merely a pretext for discrimination and that age, in fact,
was the determining factor in the selection process.
The Fourth Circuit determined that the plaintiffs in Duke had asserted
a primafacie case. The Fourth Circuit also found that the Company had
articulated a legitimate reason for terminating the plaintiffs, which was
that the plaintiffs were the least qualified to meet the needs of Uniroyal.
The Fourth Circuit then considered whether a reasonable jury could
conclude that the reasons articulated by the Company were a pretext for
age discrimination. Looking at the facts in the light most favorable to the
plaintiffs, the Fourth Circuit in Duke concluded that because the Company
did not follow its own policy in reducing the work force, the reasons
advanced by Uniroyal were in fact pretextual.
The Fourth Circuit further concluded that the alleged incorrect evidentiary ruling was harmless error, that the district court properly joined
the plaintiffs' claims and that the district court judge sufficiently adapted
the jury instructions to the cases. In addition, the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the award of attorney fees.
The Fourth Circuit in Duke additionally addressed the Company's
contention on appeal that front pay is an aspect of equitable relief for
the court's consideration. The plaintiffs asserted, to the contrary, that
front pay is a legal remedy for the jury's consideration. The Duke court
initially looked to the ADEA's remedies section and noted that the remedy
for an ADEA violation can be legal or equitable. While the preferred
remedy to compensate for preventing future loss is a reinstatement of the
job position, front pay can serve as a substitute or a complement remedy.
The Fourth Circuit recognized that in some instances reinstatement is
impossible or impractical, and in those instances front pay would be an
appropriate remedy. The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that, although
money damages can be either legal or equitable in nature, the award is
equitable if it is restitutionary. The court in Duke, noting the speculative
nature of front pay where employment is terminated without destroying
the capacity to work, determined that front pay was a restitutionary
award. The Fourth Circuit then held that front pay is an equitable remedy,
and that both its award and amount is a question for the court sitting in
equity to decide. The Duke court then held that the district court improperly submitted the issue to the jury, and vacated the part of the jury
award attributable to front pay. The Fourth Circuit finally ordered the
district court to conduct an equitable hearing to determine, in accordance
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with the Fourth Circuit's ruling, whether front pay should be awarded,
and if so in what amount. The remand order also directed the district
court to reconsider the total equitable remedies available to Fox, including
the possibility of reinstatement, front pay, or if appropriate, no remedy.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Duke is consistent with decisions by
the First, Second, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits that have expressly held
that front pay is an equitable remedy.3 9 While the Tenth Circuit has not
precisely ruled on this issue, the Tenth Circuit appears to support the
40
position that front pay is an equitable remedy for the court to decide.
On the other hand, Duke places the Fourth Circuit in direct conflict with
the Third, Sixth and Ninth Circuits. 4' The4 2 Fifth and Seventh Circuits have
issued conflicting guidance on this issfte.
Section 626 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1991), requires that any civil action filed by an
individual under the statute "shall be filed ... within 180 days after
the alleged unlawful practice occurred .... ,,43
In construing the ADEA

39. See Ramsey v. Chrysler First, Inc., 861 F.2d 1541, 1545 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding
that award of front pay is equitable relief dependent upon district court's discretion); Dominic
v. Consolidated Edison Co., 822 F.2d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that award of front
pay should be made by court); Wildermen v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605, 616 (1st Cir.
1985) (holding that district court has discretion to award front pay when reinstatement is
impracticable or impossible); Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1100 (8th Cir.
1982) (stating that district court may grant, as equitable relief, monetary damages in lieu of
reinstatement).
40. See Spulak v. K Mart Corp., 894 F.2d 1150, 1157-58 (10th Cir. 1990) (affirming
district court's post-trail award of front pay); Anderson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 861 F.2d
631, 637 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that front pay and reinstatement are alternative remedies
for making plaintiff whole).
41. See Fite v. First Tenn. Prod. Credit Ass'n, 861 F.2d 884, 893 (6th Cir. 1988) (stating
that front pay award is question for jury); Cassino v. Reichhold Chemicals, Inc., 817 F.2d
1338, 1347 (9th Cir. 1987) (concluding that jury decides amount of front pay award), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1047 (1988); Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 796 (3d Cir. 1985)
(holding that amount of damages available as front pay is jury question), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1057 (1986).
42. Compare Hansard v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 865 F.2d 1461, 1470 (5th Cir.)
(holding that jury determines amount of front pay), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 129 (1989) and
Coston v. Plitt
Theatres, Inc., 831 F.2d 1321, 1333, n.4 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that "authority
and reason" suggest that amount of front pay is jury question), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1007,
vacated on other grounds, 486 U.S. 1020 (1988), with Deloach v. Delchamps, Inc., 897 F.2d
815, 824 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that front pay is equitable remedy and amount is within trial
court's discretion) and Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 870 F.2d 1198. 1206 (7th Cir. 1989)
(stating that "we need not address the difficult question").
43. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) provides in relevant part that:
No civil action may be commenced by an individual under this section until 60 days
after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. Such a charge shall be filed(1) within 180 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred.
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statute of limitations, a number of United States Supreme Court and
Fourth Circuit opinions have dealt with the question of when the 180
day period begins to run on claims of discriminatory discharge and on
claims that a facially neutral seniority system has a discriminatory
effect. 44 These cases involving the alleged discriminatory termination of
an employee have held that a plaintiff must file a claim within 180 days
of receiving actual notice that employment will be terminated, as opposed to the actual date of termination, even if the plaintiff does not
learn until later that the discharge was discriminatory. Similarly, these
cases have also held that a plaintiff must file charges within 180 days
of the institution of a new seniority system, rather than at a later date
after discovering the discriminatory effects of the system.
In J.D. Hamilton v. 1st Source Bank, 928 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1990), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered when the
statute of limitations for filing age-based pay discrimination claims with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) begins to run under
the ADEA. The plaintiff in 1st Source, Hamilton, joined 1st Source Bank
as a Vice-President in the Truckers Bank Plan division in 1980. The plaintiff
was fifty-three years old at the time. On April 21, 1986, the bank fired
Hamilton without advance notice, claiming that Hamilton had failed to
perform his duties. Hamilton filed a timely complaint with the EEOC
alleging that the bank had discharged him because of his age in violation
of the ADEA. The EEOC failed to commence enforcement proceedings
within sixty days, and Hamilton filed suit against 1st Source Bank in the
United States District of North Carolina.
During pretrial discovery in May 1987, Hamilton learned that he had
received a lower salary than younger vice-presidents in the same job category.
44. See Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 911 (1989) (holding that
limitations period on claim that seniority system implemented by employer was discriminatory
commenced when employer adopted system); Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8 (1981)
(holding that limitations period commenced when administrators received notification of
termination at specified date in future); Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 259
(1980) (holding that limitations period commenced when professor was officially notified that
he would be offered one year "terminal" contract); United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S.
553, 561 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (holding that certain violations are continuing in

nature and thus do not trigger limitations period); English v. Pabst Brewing Co., 828 F.2d
1047, 1048 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that cause of action in age discrimination case runs from
date on which plaintiff notified of termination), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1044 (1988); Morse v.
Daily Press, Inc. 826 F.2d 1351, 1353 (4th Cir.) (holding that unequivocal notice of termination
triggers limitations period), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 965 (1987); Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co.,
785 F.2d 516, 519 (4th Cir. 1986) (same); Greene v. Whirlpool Corp., 708 F.2d 128, 130 (4th
Cir. 1983) (holding that oral claim not sufficient, written claim must be filed within 180 day
limitations period), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1042 (1984); Price v. Litton Business Sys., 694 F.2d
963, 965 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding that filing period runs from time at which employee is
informed of allegedly discriminatory employment decision, regardless of when employee

feels

effects of that decision); Lawson v. Burlington Indus., 683 F.2d 862, 863-64 (4th Cir.) (holding
that layoff constitutes completed act at time it occurred, and that employer's failure to recall
or rehire employee does not constitute separate and completed act which triggers new limitations
period), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 944 (1982).
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He then filed a new complaint with the EEOC on September 16, 1987,
seventeen months after his discharge, alleging pay discrimination. Once
again, the EEOC did not commence enforcement proceedings within sixty
days. The district court allowed Hamilton to amend his complaint to
incorporate the pay discrimination claim.
The jury returned a special verdict finding that the bank had discriminated against Hamilton on the basis of age by paying him a lower salary
as well as by discharging him, and the jury awarded Hamilton over $100,000
in damages. The district court entered an additional judgment against the
bank because the jury found that the bank had willfully discriminated
against Hamilton when it terminated his position. The court awarded an
additional $99,000 to Hamilton for the second judgment.
The bank appealed, contending that the pay discrimination claim was
statutorily time-barred and that the district court therefore erred in submitting the pay discrimination claim to the jury. A panel of the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the jury verdict in Hamilton v. 1st Source Bank, 895 F.2d 159
(4th Cir. 1990), and ruled that Hamilton's pay discrimination claim was
not time-barred under section 626(d). The panel reasoned that the 180 day
statute of limitations for a pay discrimination charge does not begin to run
until an employee discovers, or by reasonable diligence could have discovered, that he or she was a victim of pay discrimination. 1st Source Bank
petitioned for a rehearing en banc, arguing that the discovery rule, as
applied by the Fourth Circuit panel to the ADEA statute of limitations,
was contrary to congressional intent as well as circuit precedent, and
contended that Hamilton's charge of pay discrimination was time-barred.
The bank additionally requested a new trial on the ground that consideration
of the pay claim tainted the entire jury verdict.
To resolve this issue of statutory construction, the Fourth Circuit
restated the issue as whether Congress meant what it plainly said in the
ADEA-that plaintiffs shall file all charges of pay discrimination within
180 days of the occurrence of an alleged violation. The court reasoned that
to apply the discovery rule would be to completely abandon the statute.
The court found that the language of section 626(d) clearly stated that the
period of 180 days commenced when "the alleged unlawful practice occurred," and not from the time that the employee discovered the practice's
discriminatory nature. The court stated that to apply a discovery rule would
make the 180 day filing period the exception rather than the rule, finding
that an "occurrence" is a discrete event, whereas a plaintiff's acquisition
of knowledge is a continuing process. Fearing that a discovery rule would
substitute a vagueness standard for a definite time period, the court strictly
construed the statute.
The Fourth Circuit supported its decision by looking to the United
States Supreme Court's interpretation of a similar statute of limitations
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1990).
Title VII also requires plaintiffs to file charges with the EEOC "within one
hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice
occurred." In Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980), a
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university denied a professor tenure and instead offered him a one year
position. The professor brought a Title VII complaint against the university
alleging discriminatory discharge. The Supreme Court held that the claim
was time-barred under Title VII's 180 day statute of limitations as the statue
begins to run when the alleged discriminatory act occurs, not when the
plaintiff feels the consequences of such an act. The Fourth Circuit also
looked to Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989), in
which a group of female employees who had been demoted during an
economic slowdown challenged under Title VII a seniority system that had
been in effect for four years. The Supreme Court first identified the
discriminatory act as the employer's adoption of the seniority system. Then,
because the alleged discriminatory act occurred with the adoption of the
seniority system four years earlier, the Supreme Court held the employee's
claim time-barred, even though the discriminatory effects were not evident
until years afterward.
Looking particularly to the Supreme Court's analysis in Lorance, the
1st Source court held that in applying the statute of limitations contained
in section 626(d), courts must first identify the alleged unlawful act. The
date of the act will mark the time from which the 180 day period is
calculated. The Fourth Circuit determined that although notice does enter
the statute of limitations analysis, it is notice of the employer's actions, not
the notice of a discriminatory effect or motivation, that establishes the
commencement of the 180 day filing period.
Because the Fourth Circuit cited numerous discriminatory discharge
cases in support of the above analysis, Hamilton urged that a perceived
difference exists between discriminatory discharge claims and discriminatory
pay claims. The court curtly dismissed this claim, stating that it was a
"distinction without a difference." The court refused to indulge in what it
termed a subjective and speculative exercise of determining the exact degree
of employee awareness of various categories of employer practices. The
court preferred to invest the 180 day period with "the simplicity and
predictability that serviceable legal rules require." The court further stated
that the appropriate forum for recourse was the legislature itself, not the
judicial system.
In analyzing Hamilton's claim, the court found that the last possible
time that pay discrimination could have occurred was the date when Hamilton received his final paycheck. Because Hamilton did not bring his claim
to the EEOC within 180 days of that event, the court held that his claim
was time-barred. The Fourth Circuit remanded Hamilton's pay discrimination claim to the district court with direction to dismiss it as untimely filed.
In a lengthy dissent, Judge Sprouse, with whom three other judges
concurred, argued that the discovery rule should apply in interpreting the
180 day statute of limitations. After distinguishing 1st Source from both
Ricks and Lorance, Judge Sprouse argued that the Bank's discriminatory
act was not the delivery of Hamilton's paycheck to him, but instead was
the bank's decision to pay him less than the younger employees. Thus,
according to Judge Sprouse, the act of discrimination occurred during
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pretrial discovery, when Hamilton became aware that younger employees
received higher compensation than he did. Under this analysis, the statute
of limitations would not have barred Hamilton's pay discrimination claim.
Two weeks prior to the Fourth Circuit's decision in 1st Source, the
Seventh Circuit interpreted the ADEA's 180 day statute of limitations in
Cada v. Baxter HealthcareCorp., 920 F.2d 446 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S.Ct 2926 (1991). In Cada the Seventh Circuit held that the 180 day
statute of limitations under the ADEA was subject to the discovery rule,
and that therefore the period of limitations begins to run the moment a
plaintiff becomes aware that he is injured. Though the claim in Cada was
one of discriminatory discharge and not of pay discrimination, the fact that
the Fourth Circuit considers the different claims to be distinctions without
differences indicates that the circuits are split over this issue. Because the
Supreme Court denied certiorari to Cada and the Seventh Circuit is the
only court system aside from the Fourth Circuit to consider the issue, it
remains to be seen how other courts will interpret the 180 day limitations
period. While the Fourth Circuit's interpretatioi of the statute of limitations
appears to strictly honor the literal meaning of the language contained
within section 626(d) of the ADEA, this interpretation drastically favors
employers-perhaps unfairly so. The favoritism takes on an increased significance when applied to pay discrimination claims because many employers
actively discourage their employees from sharing salary information. 45 The
discovery rule, however, takes into consideration the underlying policy
inherent to statutes of limitations that such limitations periods should not
commence to run so soon that it becomes difficult for plaintiffs to adequately invoke their claims. 46 In the Fourth Circuit, however, plaintiffs will
find it difficult to invoke age discrimination claims against their employersespecially pay discrimination claims-unless they file such charges immediately upon notice of discharge.
Section 13(a) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act (the Act), 33 U.S.C. § 913(a) (1988) (section 13(a)), sets forth the
statute of limitations applicable to claims for disability due to traumatic
injury. 47 In Pillsbury v. United Engineering Co., 342 U.S. 197 (1952), the

45. See J.D. Hamilton v. 1st Source Bank, 928 F.2d 86, 89 n.3 (4th Cir. 1990). Footnote
3 in 1st Source indicates that Hamilton argued to the Fourth Circuit that many employers
discourage their employees from sharing salary information, but the 1st Source court dismissed
his argument in a cursory fashion by stating that Hamilton did not develop the existence of
such a policy nor the extent of any adherence thereto. Furthermore, the court felt that the
presence of such a policy was not relevant to the issue of when the alleged discriminatory act
occurred. Id.
46. See Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 262 n.16 (1980) (stating that
limitations period should not be so construed so that it becomes difficult for layman to invoke
protection of civil rights statutes).
47. The relevant part of § 13(a) reads:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, the right to compensation for disability
or death under this Act shall be barred unless a claim therefore [sic] is filed within
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Supreme Court held that the one year limitations period under section 13(a)
commenced running on the date of injury rather than on the date of the
4
impairment, due to the injury, of the worker's capacity to earn wages. 1
Eighteen years later, in Stancil v. Massey, 436 F.2d 274 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that the one year
statute of limitations does not begin to run until the employee reasonably
believes he has suffered work-related harm which would diminish his earning
capacity. 49 The Stancil court explained that its holding was not contrary to
the Supreme Court's Pillsbury holding because the Supreme Court had not
addressed a situation involving latent injury.
In 1972, Congress amended section 13(a) of the Act, adding language
that the limitations period does not begin to run until the employee "is
aware, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been aware,
of the relationship between the injury ... and the employment." 50 Following
Stancil and the 1972 amendment, the Fourth Circuit did not address the
issue of when the Act's statute of limitations for traumatic injuries commences to run, but other 6ircuits uniformly applied the Stancil rule when
faced with the issue." In 1984, Congress again amended the Act, adding
specific and different statute of limitations language for occupational diseases without making a corresponding change to the limitations period for
2
traumatic injury.

one year after the injury or death.... The time for filing a claim shall not begin
to run until the employee or beneficiary is aware, or by the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have been aware, of the relationship between the injury or death
and the employment.
Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 913(a) (1988). The "aware,
or ... should have been aware" language was added by amendment in 1972. Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-576, sec. 12(b), §
13(a), 86 Stat. 1251, 1259 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 913(a) (1988)).
48. Pillsbury v. United Eng'g Co. 342 U.S. 197, 200 (1952). The Pillsbury Court based
its holding on a strict reading of the statute. At the time, the relevant portion of § 13(a)
provided that "[t]he right to compensation for disability under the Act shall be barred unless
a claim therefor is filed within one year after the injury." Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 509, § 13(a), 44 Stat. 1424, 1432 (1927) (amended 1972).
The Pillsbury court stated that "[c]ongress meant what it said when it limited recovery to one
year from the date of injury." Pillsbury, 342 U.S. at 200 (emphasis added).
49. Stancil v. Massey, 436 F.2d 274, 274 (D.C. Cir. 1970). In 1970, the text of § 13(a)
of the Act read as it did when the Supreme Court decided Pillsbury in 1952. Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 509, § 13(a), 44 Stat. 1424, 1432 (1927) (amended
1972); see supra note 2 (quoting pre-1972 language of § 13(a)).
50. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972,
Pub. L. 92-576, sec. 12(b), § 13(a), 86 Stat. 1251, 1259 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §
913(a) (1988)).
51. See Marathon Oil Co. v. Lundsford, 733 F.2d 1139, 1141 (5th Cir. 1984) (stating
that 1972 amendment changed Pillsbury rule and holding employee must know, or should
know, that his condition impairs his earning capacity before statute runs against him); Todd
Shipyards Corp. v. Allen, 666 F.2d 399, 401-2 (9th Cir.) (upholding Board's application of
Stancil), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1034 (1982); Cooper Stevedoring,. Inc. v. Washington, 556
F.2d 268, 274 (5th Cir. 1977) (describing Stancil rule and holding 1972 amendment made it
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In Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Parker, 935 F.2d
20 (4th Cir. 1991), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit considered the validity of the Stancil rule in light of the 1984
amendment to the Act. The court considered whether the Act's statute of
limitations for traumatic injuries commences to run when the claimant
knows or should know that he has sustained a work-related injury or when
he knows or should know of the likely impairment of his earning capacity.
The court also addressed whether the Department of Labor Benefits Review
Board (the Board) exceeded its scope of authority by overturning the
administrative law judge's findings of fact and whether the doctrine of
laches was available as a defense under the Act.
George Parker began working for Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry
Dock (Newport News) on July 10, 1961, as a rigger. On October 31, 1962
Parker injured his right knee, resulting in a fractured patella. He was
discharged from treatment on February 16, 1963 with no disability. Parker's
knee pain continued, however, and he received periodic treatment at the
shipyard clinic. A March 23, 1978 x-ray revealed that his pain was related
to the 1962 fracture. In September 1978, Parker was referred to Dr. Rynder,
an orthopedic surgeon, who diagnosed chondromalacia patella, an abnormal
softening of ligaments in the knee.
Dr. Rynder wrote to Newport News on November 8, 1979, expressing
his view that an arthrotomy and shaving of the patella may be necessary
to solve the problem. No evidence was presented, however, that this information was ever revealed to Parker. Dr. Rynder continued to treat Parker
until November 4, 1980, when he informed Parker that medication was
controlling his symptoms and that no further appointments would be
necessary.
Parker returned to the clinic with knee pain on May 13, 1987 and was
referred to Dr. Nevins. Dr. Nevins diagnosed chondromalacia patella and
restricted Parker's climbing. Upon a follow-up visit, Dr. Nevins recommended arthroscopic surgery. Dr. Nevins performed the surgery on July 6,
1987. On August 24, 1987, Parker returned to work.
Thereafter, Parker filed a claim against Newport News for compensation
under the Act. He sought temporary total disability compensation for a
seven week period, beginning on the date of his surgery and continuing to

clear that limitations period commences only when employee knows or should know of
relationship between injury and employment); Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Bowman,
507 F.2d 146, 150 & n.8a (3rd Cir. 1975) (expressing agreement with Stancil approach and
noting that approach was adopted in 1972 amendment).
52. Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-426, sec. 12, § 13(b), 98 Stat. 1639, 1649 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.
§ 913(b)(2) (1988)). The new section provides that a claim for compensation based on disability
due to an occupational disease is timely if filed within two years of the time the employee
becomes aware or should be aware of the relationship between his employment, the disease,
and his disability. 33 U.S.C. § 913(b)(2) (1988). Congress made no corresponding change to
§ 13(a), the statute of limitations provision for traumatic injuries.
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the time he returned to work. Prior to the surgery, Parker had lost no time
from work as a result of the knee problems since recovering from the initial
injury in 1962.
A hearing was held on August 3, 1988 before an administrative law
judge (ALJ). The ALJ found that Parker tended to exaggerate his pain and
that Parker's testimony that he had believed his doctors when they told
him he would be alright was unreliable. The ALJ further determined that
the many years of pain should have alerted Parker to the seriousness of his
injury and to the likelihood of its leading to loss of earning capacity, even
if the prognosis was favorable. The ALJ concluded that Parker should have
known of the likelihood of loss of earning capacity by November 8, 1979,
the date of Dr. Rynder's letter to Newport News.
After determining that the Act's one year statute of limitations begins
to run when the claimant knows or has reason to know of the likely
impairment of his earning capacity, the ALJ found that Parker's time for
filing a claim expired on November 8, 1980. Because Parker did not file
his claim until seven years after this date, the ALJ denied the claim. The
ALJ also held that the doctrine of laches did not apply because the Act
contained a specific statute of limitations. Parker appealed and Newport
News cross-appealed to the Board.
Applying the interpretation of the Act's statute of limitations announced
in Stancil, the Board affirmed the ALJ's determination that the limitations
period commences to run when the claimant knows or has reason to know
of the likely impairment of his earning capacity. However, the Board
reversed the ALJ's finding that Parker should have known of the likely
impairment by November 8, 1979. The Board determined that the statute
did not begin to run until June of 1987 when Parker's surgery was scheduled.
Consequently, the Board awarded Parker the temporary total disability
benefits he sought. The Board affirmed the ALJ's ruling that laches does
not apply under the Act. Newport News appealed to the Fourth Circuit.
Newport News first contended that the Act's statute of limitations
begins to run when the claimant is aware or should be aware that he has
experienced a serious work-related injury, rather than when the claimant
knows or should know of the likely impairment of earning capacity. Newport
News argued that the Board erred in applying the Stancil interpretation of
section 13(a), because Stancil ignored the explicit language of the 1970
statute as well as the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in Pillsbury.
Newport News also urged that the plain meaning of section 13(a) is that
the statute begins to run when the employee knows or should know he has
sustained an injury. Section 13(a) provides that a claim for compensation
must be filed within one year after the injury. The section further provides
that the time for filing shall not begin to run until the employee is aware
or should be aware of the relationship between the injury and the employment.
Newport News further argued that by adding specific and different
language to the statute of limitations for occupational diseases in the 1984
amendment and not making a corresponding change to Section 13(a),
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Congress intended that the injury, rather than the awareness of loss of
earning capacity, should commence the running of the statute of limitations
for traumatic injuries. The 1984 amendment to the Act, in section 13(b)(2),
provided that claims for disability compensation based on occupational
disease shall be timely if filed within two years after the employee becomes
aware or should have been aware of the relationship between the employment, the disease, and the disability. To support its claim, Newport News
quoted portions of the Report of the House Committee on Education and
Labor discussing the proposed changes to the Act. The quoted language
stressed the Committee's belief that commencing the limitations period on
the date of injury makes little sense in cases of occupational disease in
which the disability does not immediately follow the injury. Based on this
language, Newport News urged that by enacting the 1984 amendment
Congress intended to return to the Supreme Court's Pillsbury interpretation.
The Fourth Circuit first discussed the Pillsbury and Stancil decisions.
The Court commented that both Pillsbury and Stancil had been decided
before the 1972 amendment added the "aware or should have been aware"
language. The Newport News court noted that the Supreme Court in
Pillsbury had acknowledged that none of the claimants had a latent injury
or occupational disease. The Fourth Circuit then explained the reasoning
behind the Stancil court's holding that the limitations period does not begin
to run until the employee knows or should know of the likelihood his
earning capacity would be diminished. In Stancil, the court construed the
term "injury" to mean the harmful consequences of an accident, which
need not occur simultaneously with the accident. The Stancil court held
that until an employee knows or has reason to know of the likely impairment
of earning capacity, there is no "injury" for purposes of filing a claim
under the Act. The Fourth Circuit reiterated the Stancil court's explanation
that its holding was not contrary to Pillsbury because Pillsbury had not
construed the term "injury" for latent injury cases. The Fourth Circuit
then cited a number of cases to support the position that after Stancil and
the 1972 amendment, which added the "aware or should be aware" language, courts began to uniformly apply the Stancil rule in determining when
the limitations period commences.
The Fourth Circuit next addressed Newport News' claim that Congress
had intended by the 1984 amendments to return to the Pillsbury rule. The
Court first noted that the D.C. Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, and the Eleventh
Circuit, all of which had considered the issue after the 1984 amendment,
continued to apply the well-established Stancil rule. The court then stated
that Congress, by failing to make changes in section 13(a) corresponding
to the new provision for occupational diseases in section 13(b)(2), could
just as likely have been expressing its satisfaction with the existing decisional
law as to traumatic injuries as it could have been expressing its intent to
return to the Pillsbury rule. The court found it unlikely, given the policy
considerations underlying the Act, that Congress intended to have latent
traumatic injuries treated inconsistently with occupational diseases for purposes of the commencement of the limitations period. The court concluded
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that the 1984 amendment could not fairly be interpreted as a congressional
mandate to return to the Pillsbury rule. Consequently, the Newport News
court held that the Board had not erred in applying Stancil and ruling that
the statute of limitations did not begin to run until Parker knew or had
reason to know that the 1962 injury was likely to impair his earning capacity.
Newport News also argued that the ALJ's finding that the statute
commenced to run on November 8, 1979 was supported by. substantial
evidence and that the Board exceeded its scope of review in reversing the
ALJ. The court noted that under the Act, the ALJ's findings of fact are
deemed "conclusive if supported by substantial evidence on the record as
a whole.""3 The court agreed with the Board, however, that the experiencing
of pain is insufficient as a matter of law to establish the likely impairment
of earning power.
The Newport News court stated that the only logical explanation for
the ALJ's choice of November 8, 1979 as the date the limitations period
commenced was Dr. Rynder's letter to Newport News on the same date
indicating that future surgery might be necessary. The court stated, however,
that Newport News presented no evidence to. contradict Parker's testimony
that the possibility of surgery was not conveyed to him. The court also
noted that Dr. Rynder subsequently changed his prognosis by indicating
Parker's symptoms were under control. The court thus agreed with the
Board that no substantial evidence was presented to support the ALJ's
finding and held that the Board did not exceed its scope of review in
reversing the ALJ and substituting its own finding of the date on which
the limitations period commenced.
Newport News' final argument was that the Board erred in holding that
laches was not a defense under the Act. The court stated that the equitable
doctrine of laches bars stale causes of action if the party bringing the action
lacks diligence in pursuing his claim and the party asserting the defense has
been prejudiced by the lack of diligence. The court held that it was not
necessary to determine whether laches was available under the Act because
it would not have changed the result in the instant case. The court stated
that Parker's claim had not only been timely, but that Newport News could
not claim it was prejudiced by any lack of diligence because it knew
everything about the injury that Parker himself knew.
The greatest portion of the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Newport News
was devoted to Newport News' first argument, that the Board erred in
determining the statute of limitations commenced to run when the claimant
knew or should have known his earning capacity had been impaired. In
upholding the Board's determination, the Fourth Circuit is in line with the
D.C. Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, and the Eleventh Circuit, all of which have
54
addressed the issue in the aftermath of the 1984 amendment.

53. 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3) (1988).
54. See Abel v. Director of Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 932 F.2d 819,
822 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Stancil and holding that limitations period begins to run when

